On June 27, 2025, China’s national legislature, the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress (NPCSC), approved an overhaul of the 2005 Public Security Administration Punishments Law (PSAPL) [治安管理处罚法], bringing a 12-year legislative marathon to a close. The revised PSAPL will enter into force on January 1, 2026.
The PSAPL sits at the intersection of Chinese criminal law and administrative law. On the one hand, it is a penal statute that defines “violations of public security administration”: relatively minor public order offenses that generally correspond to more serious “crimes” in the Criminal Law [刑法]. These violations are punishable with warnings, fines, license revocations, and even detention of up to 15 days (or up to 20 days for multiple offenses). The PSAPL also lays down the procedures for investigating and punishing the violations, so it is like the Criminal Law and the Criminal Procedure Law [刑事诉讼法] rolled into one. On the other hand, the PSAPL skirts the normal criminal justice process, authorizing the police to penalize public security violations by themselves through nominally administrative proceedings. It incorporates most of the procedures under the Administrative Punishments Law [行政处罚法] and the Administrative Coercion Law [行政强制法]—which regulate, respectively, administrative punishments (e.g., fines and detention) and coercive administrative measures (e.g., investigative restraints on physical liberty and property seizures)—while adapting them to the public security context.
As the first meaningful update of the PSAPL in 20 years, the revision has introduced too many changes to recount individually. To summarize, it has tweaked the general rules of liability and punishments; added around 30 new offenses to the original 152 and modified about 20 others; increased fines across the board; and refined investigatory and decisionmaking procedures.
We will cover the revision in two parts. In this first part, we will delve into a few major changes (or sets of changes), drawing on a recent explainer by Zhang Yijian, a division head in the Office for Criminal Law within the NPCSC Legislative Affairs Commission (LAC).1 Though necessarily biased and self-congratulatory—the article portrays a legislature that tempered the more aggressive draft prepared by the Ministry of Public Security (MPS)—it explains in detail why certain changes were or weren’t made, offers glimpses of behind-the-scenes debates, and candidly acknowledges some flaws in the PSAPL regime. In the next part, we will take a more comprehensive look at the changes but without detailed analysis.
Recalibrating Administrative Detention
China’s use of administrative detention—depriving liberty as a form of punishment without prior judicial authorization—is contrary to prevailing international human rights norms. But it is here to stay. The LAC defends China’s distinction between criminal imprisonment and administrative detention, and its classification of the latter as a non-criminal punishment, contending that this practice is “a unique legal tradition” (the PSAPL’s first iteration was enacted in 1957) and “consistent with China’s national conditions and realities” (p. 38).
At the same time, the LAC acknowledges that administrative detention imposes more severe restrictions on individual rights than do other types of administrative punishments. It also recognizes that public concerns over the “procedural legitimacy and proportionality” of prolonged liberty restrictions imposed by administrative organs are becoming increasingly hard (for the legislature, presumably) to ignore (p. 38).
Reflecting this tension, the revision both extends detention to previously exempt age groups in cases of repeat or serious violations and also places modest limits on its broader use through shorter or optional detention for certain offenses.
Expanding Detention for Minors (and the Elderly)
Under the current (i.e., pre-revision) PSAPL, children under 14 are immune from all punishments, consistent with China’s age of criminal responsibility before 2021 (when it was lowered to 12 for the most serious crimes). In addition, 14- and 15-year-olds are exempt from detention, while 16- and 17-year-olds can be detained only if it is not their first offense.
The revision does not raise the age of responsibility under the PSAPL but allows for the detention of minors 14 or older in more situations. Starting next year, minors aged 14–17 may be detained if their violations involve “serious circumstances” and have “a vile impact” (art. 23, para. 2).2 And those aged 16–17 may also be detained for their second or subsequent violation within the same year, regardless of circumstances or impact.
The original rules were designed to help minors repent and reform by avoiding “cross-infections”—negative influences from adult detainees—in detention centers, according to the LAC (p. 36). And this special exemption was supposed to work alongside the community-based rehabilitative measures under the Juvenile Delinquency Prevention Law [预防未成年人犯罪法], such as warnings, psychological counseling, and community service. In recent years, however, some minors have deliberately exploited their status to repeatedly violate the PSAPL, but the relevant local authorities failed to employ those measures, prompting public anger, claims the LAC (pp. 36–37). Hence, in addition to the changes already mentioned, the revision explicitly requires the police to apply the delinquency law to a minor who is not to be punished or detained (art. 24).
Similarly, the revision also revokes the categorical exemption from detention now afforded to those aged 70 or older. Starting in 2026, senior individuals who have committed serious violations or violate the PSAPL more than once within a year will be subject to detention (art. 23, para. 2).
Curbing Availability and Use of Detention—Somewhat
In parallel, the revision also makes a raft of changes aimed at “further regulating the availability and use of detention and reducing unnecessary detention,” even though, as the LAC notes, it did not noticeably reduce detention-eligible offenses (p. 43).
First, the NPCSC rejected the MPS’s proposals to lengthen detention for some offenses, which would have either added a new, higher range or extended an existing one. Those offenses are (1) unlawfully carrying firearms, ammunition, or controlled devices into public places or transport (art. 38, para. 2); (2) damaging or otherwise tampering with rail facilities (art. 41); (3) unsafe presence on rail tracks (art. 42); and (4) soliciting prostitution in public places (art. 78). (Granted, the MPS did also propose reducing detention for vandalism (art. 59) and impersonating private individuals or using false identities to defraud (art. 62, para. 3).)
Second, the revision adds lesser penalties—shorter detention or non-custodial punishments—for “relatively minor” violations of these offenses: (1) damaging critical public infrastructure or tampering with national boundaries or related facilities (art. 39); (2) inciting ethnic hatred or discrimination (art. 55); (3) obstructing or interfering with administrative law enforcement (art. 72); and(4) tipping off patrons about police action in certain service industries (art. 87).
Third, the revision will make detention optional for some offenses, absent aggravating circumstances. For “picking quarrels and making trouble” (art. 30) (more on this offense below) and minor property offenses such as theft and vandalism (arts. 58–59), detention is practically mandatory under the current PSAPL. The MPS’s draft would also have required detention for several other offenses, including continuing to violate noise regulations after official intervention (Aug. 2023 Draft art. 86). For all these offenses, the police may fine the violators instead under the revised PSAPL.
Finally, there are also several offenses for which the revised PSAPL imposes detention only, but other laws or regulations provide for non-custodial penalties, such as unlawfully selling or providing personal information (art. 56; see Cybersecurity Law [网络安全法] art. 64). The NPCSC clarified that other penalties should be imposed first and detention given only when “necessary” (i.e., when the circumstances are serious) (art. 141, para. 3; see also pp. 43, 51).
Of course, the changes to detention were not unidirectional. The revision also lengthens the possible detention for a handful of offenses, including intruding on or tampering with computer systems (art. 33); holding large-scale events or operating public accommodations despite safety risks and official warnings (arts. 44–45); abusing family members or dependents (art. 53); and unlawfully running civil society organizations (art. 65, para. 1, items 1–2). Detention, moreover, is available for all new offenses except keeping animals in a way that disturbs or threatens others (art. 89, para. 1).
Going forward, the LAC calls on the police to “fully recognize the particular severity of administrative detention as a measure restricting physical liberty” and refrain from detention “unless necessary” (p. 43). It faults law enforcement for failing to use detention cautiously in practice, pointing out that it carries “severe collateral consequences” for those affected and provokes “strong public opposition” (id.).
Compromising on Hearing Rights
Under the current PSAPL, a private party may request a hearing only when the proposed punishment is license revocation or a fine of RMB 2,000 or more. Those facing detention have no right to a hearing. Nor does the Administrative Punishments Law, as revised in 2021, explicitly require hearings for administrative detention.3 And, in practice, the police rarely hold hearings in public security cases (p. 46).
Whether hearings should be available for detention was a major point of dispute during the PSAPL revision process. According to the LAC, some comments cited the scholarly consensus that hearings should be available for all uses of detention. Law enforcement, on the other hand, resisted expanding hearing rights due to the “enormous” volume of public security cases resulting in detention each year (p. 46). Instead, they proposed relying on either pre-decisional “legal review” [法制审核] or after-the-fact administrative or judicial review to correct errors. (The revised PSAPL does not, however, require legal review of every decision to impose detention.)
Though conceding it is currently “unfeasible” to require detention hearings in all relevant cases, the legislature refused to “allow practical difficulties in law enforcement to hinder progress in protecting human rights” (p. 46). So, after balancing the competing interests, it adopted the following compromise.
First, as the MPS proposed, hearings are available as of right before the police revoke a license, impose a fine of RMB 4,000 or more (increased from RMB 2,000), or order the suspension of business operations for rectification (art. 117, para. 1). Second, hearings are also available as of right to minors facing detention under the new rules discussed earlier (id. para. 2). Third, the revision gives the police discretion to hold hearings in other cases with “complex circumstances” or “a major social impact” (id. para. 3).
To encourage the use of hearings (at least where they are available), the revision prohibits the police from escalating punishments after a party has requested a hearing (id. para. 4) and specifies that the time for holding hearings does not count toward the time limit for resolving public security cases (30 days by default, but extendable up to 90 days) (art. 118, para. 2).
The LAC warns public security bureaus against imposing fines below RMB 4,000, declining to detain minors, or using other similar tactics just to avoid a hearing (p. 47). But this seems like a problem of the NPCSC’s own creation—the use of simple on/off switches for hearings—and one over which it is unlikely to conduct effective oversight.
Grappling with Statutory Vagueness
China’s criminal code is riddled with vague or open-ended provisions that punish, for example, certain acts with “other heinous circumstances” or “other serious consequences.” The revised PSAPL, in comparison, fares much better on this score. The LAC says that it “has strived to define unlawful conduct in clear, explicit terms to avoid ambiguity and uncertainty” (p. 38). While the finalized revision did add specificity to some offenses and tempered some of the MPS’s more problematic proposals, concerns about vague offenses, especially speech restrictions, remain.
“Hurting the Feelings of the Chinese People”
The most notorious proposal would have outlawed (1) publicly wearing “clothing or symbols that are detrimental to the spirit of the Chinese people or hurt the feelings of the Chinese people”; and (2) producing, transmitting, promoting, or disseminating “items or speech” of a similar nature (Aug. 2023 Draft art. 34, items 2–3). The drafters presumably had in mind widely publicized and denounced incidents of Chinese citizens posing in Imperial Japanese army uniforms at historic sites of the Second Sino-Japanese War (1937–45). The Chinese public was far from enthusiastic about the proposal, however, submitting over 125,000 comments on the revision’s first draft, most of which were likely critical.
In response, the legislature adopted more concrete language. As enacted, Article 35, item 5 limits the offending clothing or symbols to those that “promote or glorify wars of aggression or acts of invasion”—which seem to refer primarily, if not solely, to Japan’s invasion and occupation of China during World War II—while conditioning punishment on the violator’s refusal to heed dissuasion and causing a negative social impact. Item 4, moreover, penalizes making or spreading similar speech (including photos and audiovisual materials), thereby disrupting the public order. With this change, the NPCSC was able to appease and appear responsive to public concerns, all the while retaining the substance of the MPS’s intended restrictions—the best of both worlds.
In addition, Article 35 joins recent civil and criminal legislation in further cracking down on disrespect for China’s “heroes and martyrs” (art. 35, items 2–4). Listed prohibitions include insulting or defaming those individuals; desecrating or denying their deeds; and even engaging in activities that “harm the environment and atmosphere for commemorating heroes and martyrs at memorial facilities,” despite dissuasion. The LAC indicates that mere challenges to official narratives about heroes and martyrs—without resorting to insult or defamation—could still be punishable for harming their image or reputation.
Finally, Article 35 also bans activities at or near national celebrations, commemorations, or public memorials that go against the “theme and atmosphere” of those events, despite discouragement (id. item 1). According to an authoritative commentary, wearing funeral attire and playing funeral music near Tiananmen Square during National Day celebrations, or setting off fireworks during the moment of silence on Martyrs’ Day, would violate this provision.
Violations of Article 35 will result in detention of 5–10 days or a fine of RMB 1,000–3,000. More serious offenders will be detained for 10–15 days and may be concurrently fined up to RMB 5,000.
Insulting the Police as Obstruction
Another provision in the MPS’s draft would have treated mere insult or verbal abuse of police officers as aggravated obstruction of official business, requiring heavier punishments (within prescribed limits) than for other forms of obstruction (Aug. 2023 Draft art. 59, para. 2).
During public consultation, we (read: Changhao) commented that it defies common sense to say that coarse language alone can obstruct police work and that the subjectivity of what counts as an insult or invective would surely invite abuse. Gladly, we weren’t alone. According to the LAC, it had received comments cautioning that the proposed provision could intrude on citizens’ rights to criticize, make suggestions about, and file complaints or charges against, state employees—rights protected by Article 41 of the PRC Constitution (p. 39).
The finalized revision deleted the added language and reverted to the original text, providing simply that obstruction of police work merits heavier punishments: a fine of up to RMB 500 by default, and up to 10 days in detention with a discretionary fine of up to RMB 1,000 for more serious violations (art. 61, para. 2).
“Picking Quarrels and Making Trouble”
The LAC reports that the revised PSAPL uses no catch-all provision for any offense except for “picking quarrels and making trouble” [寻衅滋事] (p. 39). That assertion seems premised on an unduly narrow definition of catch-all provisions. Article 28, paragraph 1, item 6, for example, prohibits “any other act disrupting the order of large-scale crowd activities,” such as sporting and cultural events—in other words, it serves to catch all other unenumerated disruptive acts. Yet catch-alls of this sort are tied to (comparatively) concrete harms the law aims to prevent or remedy, or can be readily limited to prohibitions of the same kind as expressly listed ones. In this regard, “picking quarrels,” even as revised, remains different.
The relevant provision, Article 35, bars the following acts (text in boldface was added by the revision):
(1) fighting in gangs or arbitrarily hitting people;
(2) chasing or intercepting others;
(3) forcibly taking, demanding, or arbitrarily damaging or seizing public or private property; and
(4) other acts of picking quarrels and making trouble that disturb others without cause and disrupt social order [无故侵扰他人、扰乱社会秩序].
Item 4 is the catch-all. Like its criminal-law counterpart, it has been used to penalize a wide variety of behaviors in practice, from disturbing others’ lives by sending them hell money or urinating in front of their doors, to skipping out on expensive bills, to engaging in expression or activism the government disfavors, such as criticizing state leaders or policies online, disturbing workplace order through petitioning, and threatening “extreme acts” by calling official hotlines over demotion disputes.4 This clause was also used to penalize the citizens cosplaying as Imperial Japanese soldiers mentioned earlier.
The LAC emphasizes that the revision has “further standardized and narrowed” the catch-all provision (p. 39). Yet it is not clear that this change could meaningfully limit the police’s discretion. Even with the added conduct and effect requirements, the overall category—“picking quarrels and making trouble”—remains undefined and elastic. Even the added “limitations” rely on the subjective and manipulable notions of “justifiable cause” and “social order.” It is not difficult to imagine the police again invoking the revised catch-all provision to punish the persistent petitioner.
- 张义健 [Zhang Yijian], 2025年《治安管理处罚法》修订解读 [Explaining the 2025 Revision to the Public Security Administration Punishments Law], 中国法律评论 [China L. Rev.], no. 4, 2025, at 32. Inline page citations are to this version. ↩︎
- Inline statutory citations are to the revised PSAPL unless otherwise indicated. ↩︎
- In two catch-all provisions, this Law allows parties to request hearings for “other relatively heavy punishments” or in other situations prescribed by law. But it was not clear that administrative detention falls into either category. ↩︎
- See 周光权 [Zhou Guangquan], 违反治安管理行为与犯罪的界限 [The Boundary Between Violations of Public Security Administration and Crimes], 中国法律评论 [China L. Rev.], no. 4, 2025, at 53, 56. Zhou is a professor and former dean of the Tsinghua University School of Law and a vice chair of the 14th NPC Constitution and Law Committee. ↩︎