China’s national legislature, the National People’s Congress (NPC) and its Standing Committee (NPCSC), has the constitutional power and duty to “oversee the enforcement of the Constitution.” Yet for decades this task had remained a low priority for the legislature. Since Xi Jinping took power in late 2012, he has “elevated the Party’s rhetorical commitment to the Constitution” on numerous occasions. For instance, in writing to commemorate the current Constitution’s 40th anniversary in December 2022, Xi stressed the need to “continuously enhance constitutional enforcement and supervision”—and to, of course, do so under the Party’s leadership. Against this backdrop, the NPCSC has made constitutional enforcement a more significant and visible part of its work; its annual work reports to the NPC have included dedicated sections on “constitutional enforcement” [宪法实施]1 since 2020.
On February 23, possibly starting a new yearly practice, the legislature posted on its official website a report on its efforts to “strengthen and innovate constitutional enforcement” in 2023, written by the NPCSC Legislative Affairs Commission’s Office for Constitution.2 The report is worth reading for it not only discloses new constitutional practices from the past year that may have escaped most people’s attention, but also catalogs the kinds of activities that officially constitute “constitutional enforcement.” The report also likely serves as the basis for the section in the NPCSC’s forthcoming 2024 work report on constitutional enforcement. Below, we will discuss the report through a mix of summary and translation: parts that we found particularly noteworthy will be translated and annotated, whereas the rest will be summarized to varying extents. We added some paragraph breaks and text formatting in blockquotes to improve readability.
Continue reading “Dissecting the Chinese Legislature’s First Annual Report on Constitutional Enforcement”
